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STATUTES
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD DEE THOMAS,

:

Petitioner/Appellant,

:

v.

:

Case No. 940334-CA

SCOTT CARVER,

:

Category No. 3

Respondent/Appellee.

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE SCOTT CARVER
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of
the Utah Court of Appeals under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (g)
(1994) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Richard Dee Thomas has not marshaled the evidence in

support of the trial court's findings of fact and this Court should
therefore assume that the record supports such findings and affirm
the same.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

This Court should survey the record in

the light most favorable to the trial court's findings of fact and
only reverse if there is no reasonable basis therein to support the
trial court's findings.

Northern v. Barnes, 870 P.2d 914, 915

(Utah 1994).
2. The Board of Pardon's decisions concerning petitioner were not
arbitrary or capricious, did not subject petitioner to double
jeopardy, and it was the Board, and not the sentencing court, that
had authority to determine whether or not to grant petitioner

credit for time served prior to conviction.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

This issue presents only a question of

law which this Court reviews for correctness giving no deference to
the trial court.

Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869 P.2d 945

(Utah 1994).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Respondent-Appellee submits that there are no determinative
statutes and rules in this matter.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Richard Dee Thomas, an inmate incarcerated at the Utah State
Prison, filed this action for an extraordinary writ alleging that
he had not been properly afforded credit for time served on a third
degree felony conviction by the Board of Pardons.

R. 4-8.

The

respondent, Scott Carver, filed an answer denying that petitioner's
rights had been violated. R. 50-56. The writ was heard on May 12,
1994 by the trial court, and the trial court verbally granted the
respondent's motion to dismiss.

R. 114.

Petitioner's Notice of

Appeal was filed with the trial court on May 24, 1994.

R. 115A.

Judge Michael R. Murphy's Final Order, including Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, was entered on June 2, 1994. R. 121-27.
STATEMENT OP RELEVANT FACTS
Richard Thomas has not sought to marshal any of the evidence,
either that supporting the trial court's findings of fact, or that
contrary to the trial court's findings.

For this reason, the

respondent-appellee submits the following Findings of Fact as
entered by the trial court on June 2, 1994 as their statement of
2

relevant facts
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Misdemeanor. The Board issued a new parole date for September 22,
1992.
On September 22, 1992, Petitioner paroled from the prison, but
on October 6, 1992, the Board issued a warrant to detain him on
allegations that he had again violated his parole agreement.
was arrested the day the warrant was issued.

He

On January 6, 1993,

Petitioner appeared before the Board for a parole revocation
hearing to answer the allegations that he had violated his parole
agreement.

The hearing was conducted in accordance with R671 of

the Utah Administrative Code (1993).

Petitioner was present and

represented by legal counsel.
Petitioner pled not guilty to the following parole violation
allegations: 1) having committed failed programming; 2) having
failed urinalysis; and 3) having committed the crime of Possession
of a Controlled Substance.

The Board then continued the matter,

setting an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual disputes
surrounding the parole violation allegations.
On March 8, 1993, an evidentiary hearing was conducted by the
Board in accordance with R671 of the Utah Administrative Code
(1993).

The Board received testimony and documentary evidence and

heard argument from both Petitioner's counsel and the Department of
Corrections.

Based upon the evidence, the Board found that

Petitioner had violated his parole agreement, and it revoked his
parole.

The Board then set a new parole date for April 13, 1993.

Petitioner was given a written decision, including the Board's
rationale. The Board also issued written findings and conclusions,
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The Board answered Petitioner's petition, pursuant to this
court's order, and it denied failing to give Petitioner credit for
any time to which he is legally entitled.

As calculated by the

Board, Petitioner's sentences of imprisonment will not statutorily
expire until after Petitioner's death, unless shortened by the
Board.1

Furthermore,

the

records

of

the

Board

show

that

Petitioner's sentence in Case No. 881910631 expired on December 4,
1993 (approximately five years from the date he was committed to
the prison), and both parties agree that specific sentence has
terminated.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Richard Dee Thomas is serving two consecutive five-to-life
sentences.

Petitioner presents sundry vague challenges to the

Board of Pardons decisions concerning parole.

Thomas has been

paroled on several occasions, only to return to the prison with new
criminal convictions.

He is currently awaiting trial on a new

first degree felony charge, and the Board is awaiting the trial in
that matter to make its next parole determination concerning
Thomas.
Having failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial
court's findings, Thomas cannot challenge the same and this Court
should assume that the findings are supported by the record.
The

Board

of

Pardon's

decisions

on

how much

time

the

petitioner must serve on his two consecutive five-to-life sentences

1

Petitioner is serving two concurrent five-to-life sentences
with a consecutive zero-to-five year sentence.
6

have not been arbitrary or capricious and the petitioner's writ was
therefore properly denied.
Thomas' claim that he was subjected to double jeopardy because
the Board considered a new misdemeanor conviction in setting a new
parole date is without merit.
Thomas claims that he was not given credit for time served (on
parole violation charges) towards a new third degree felony
conviction.

First, such argument is moot because the challenged

sentence has already terminated.

Second, the sentencing court's

order that the Board of Pardons grant such credit was contrary to
Utah law and ineffectual.
ARGUMENT
I.
PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDINGS OF FACT - WHICH SHOULD THEREFORE BE
ASSUMED SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD
Other than his claims that the trial court erred as a matter
of law, Richard Dee Thomas also makes one claim that the trial
court's findings of fact are erroneous.

Petitioner appears to

claim that the findings of fact are wrong in holding that a
challenged third degree felony sentence had expired as a factual
matter and that Thomas was still serving two first degree felony
sentences and a further, consecutive, third degree felony sentence.
Thomas makes no statement of facts in his opening brief. He
does not marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's
Findings of Facts. Petitioner does not seek to show in any manner
that the evidence in the record is insufficient to support the
trial court's Findings of Fact. For this reason, this Court should
7

assume that the record supports the findings of the trial court.
If a challenge is made to the findings, an
appellant must marshal all evidence in favor
of the facts as found by the trial court and
then demonstrate that even viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the
court below, the evidence is insufficient to
support the findings of fact.
If the
appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the
appellate court assumes that the record
supports the findings of the trial court and
proceeds to the review of the accuracy of the
lower court's conclusions of law and the
application of that law in the case.
Saunders v. Sharp, 8.06 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991).
The unchallenged findings of fact show that petitioner is
serving two concurrent sentences of five-to-life, and a third
consecutive sentence of zero-to-five years.

These findings are

supported by the record.2 R. 125 and Defendant's Exhibit 1, at pp.
2-4.

While petitioner has received other convictions, some of

which have since terminated, the fact that these three sentences
are not terminated is undisputed.
Petitioner's does not dispute these ongoing sentences that he
is serving.

Instead, petitioner claims that he was not given

proper credit for time served on a further third degree felony
conviction.

Defendant's Exhibit 1, at p. 1.

But the undisputed

finding of fact is that Richard Dee Thomas has already finished
serving

the

challenged

sentence.

R.

125.

His

current

incarceration is independent of the challenged sentence that the

2

Indeed, the only error in the Findings of Fact of the trial
court is that the two five-to-life sentences of the petitioner are
to be served consecutively and not concurrently as stated by the
trial court. Defendant's Exhibit 1 at p. 2.
8

parties agree has terminated.

Thomas has not presented any

evidence of record to show in any manner that the trial court's
finding of fact concerning this question is in error.
The undisputed findings of fact establish an ongoing pattern.
Thomas has been paroled by the Utah Board of Pardons and Paroles on
several occasions. Each of these paroles ended in petitioner being
returned to parole pursuant to charges of parole violations.
many

of

these

occasions, Thomas

also

received

new

On

criminal

convictions. Indeed, Thomas is currently awaiting trial on a first
degree felony charge arising from his most recent period on parole,
from April 13, 1993 to July 1, 1993.

R. 124.

In no manner has

petitioner sought to challenge the findings of the trial court
concerning Thomas' record on parole, his parole violations, or his
new criminal charges.
Because petitioner has not marshaled the evidence in support
of the trial court's findings of fact, and has not shown how the
evidence of record is insufficient to support the trial court's
factual findings, including the finding that the challenged third
degree felony conviction had terminated, this Court should assume
"that the record supports the findings of the trial court" and
proceed

"to the review of the accuracy of the lower court's

conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case."
Saunders, 806 P.2d at 199.

9

II. THE DECISIONS OP THE UTAH STATE BOARD OF
PARDONS AND PAROLE CONCERNING RICHARD DEE
THOMAS HAVE NOT VIOLATED ANY CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OP THE PETITIONER
In Malek v. Sawava, 730 P.2d 629, 630 (Utah 1986), the Utah
Supreme Court made it clear that an extraordinary writ is "not an
available

remedy

in the

absence

of

a

claim

of

fundamental

unfairness at trial or a substantial and prejudicial denial of
constitutional rights." The trial court correctly determined that
petitioner had failed to present such a claim.
A. The Board's decisions concerning Thomas' parole status were
neither arbitrary nor capricious.
Thomas' claims all demonstrate a misunderstanding of Utah law.
Petitioner does not seem to understand that he is still serving two
life sentences and that the Utah Board of Pardons has discretion to
require him to serve any or all of those sentences.
House, 252 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 12 (Utah 1994).

Preece v.

The fact that the

Board has placed Thomas on parole on numerous occasions, and that
petitioner has violated that trust on each occasion, supports the
Boards current determination to keep Thomas incarcerated.

The

Board is not required to conform to the sentencing guidelines. Id.
Utah's sentencing guidelines "used by the board of pardons do not
have the force and effect of law."

Id.

Absent some other

constitutional infirmity, the courts do not sit as a panel of
review on the Board's function. Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons,
869 P.2d

945, 947

(Utah 1994).

"So long as the period of

incarceration decided upon by the board of pardons falls within an
inmate's applicable indeterminate range . . . then that decision,
10

absent unusual circumstances, cannot be arbitrary and capricious."
Preece, 252 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12.
Petitioner

errs

in

trying

to

equate

Utah's

sentencing

guidelines (which are not binding) with the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. The two are not identical, nor are they similar. The
Utah Supreme Court has already rejected, in Preece a claim that an
inmate has a constitutional right of some kind to be treated in
accordance to Utah's guidelines.

Indeed, Preece involved another

inmate serving two five-to-life sentences that the Board of Pardons
determined

should

serve

more

time

than

called

for

by

the

guidelines.
The trial court correctly dismissed petitioner's challenge to
the Board of Pardon's decision concerning the length of time that
petitioner must serve before he will once more placed on parole.
There

is nothing

arbitrary and capricious about

the board's

decision to await the outcome of petitioner's trial on new first
degree felony charges before determining what parole date, if any,
to set.
B. The Utah Board of Pardon's has not subjected the petitioner to
double jeopardy.
Mr. Thomas claims that the Utah State Board of Pardons erred
in considering his conviction for a misdemeanor in determining
Thomas' parole eligibility and setting a tentative parole date.
Again, Thomas has erred as to Utah law.

The Board of Pardons can

consider allegations of misconduct even if the inmate has been
found not guilty in a criminal proceeding in determining in an
administrative parole revocation proceeding that the inmate had
11

committed the charged offenses.

Johns v. Shulsen, 717 P. 2d 1336

(Utah 1986) . The Board does not subject Thomas to double jeopardy
when it simply takes into consideration a recent misdemeanor
conviction, as well as any other recent misconduct, in determining
petitioner's eligibility for parole.
C. The Board of Pardons and not the sentencing court has authority
to give credit for time served prior to conviction.
It is undisputed that petitioner's sentence in Case No.
881910631 (a conviction of a third degree felony) has terminated.
But Richard Thomas claims that the Board of Pardons erred by not
giving his credit for time served prior to conviction as ordered by
the trial court.

The first error in this argument is that the

question is moot. Petitioner is not now serving this sentence, and
the question of when this sentence expired is of only academic
interest

because

the

petitioner

is

still

serving

two

life

sentences.
Even if this issue was not moot, petitioner has once again
misunderstood Utah law.

The sentencing court had no authority to

order the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole to grant credit for time
served prior to the conviction.

In State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d

264 (Utah 1985) , the Utah Supreme Court made it clear that the
Board of Pardons was vested with the power to grant or deny such
credit.

The only exception to this rule is where an indigent was

subjected to pretrial incarceration because he or she was not able
to post bail.

State v. Richards, 740 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 1987).

Where, as here, a parolee was reincarcerated on suspicion of parole
violation, the Board of Pardons has the discretion to determine
12

whether or not to grant credit for the time so served, not the
trial court.

Rawlinas v. Holden, 869 P.2d 958, 960-62 (Utah App.

1994); Northern v. Barnes, 825 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah App. 1992),
affld, 870 P.2d 914 (Utah 1993); State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 737
(Utah App. 1991); State v. Alvillar, 748 P.2d 207, 208-10 (Utah
App. 1988) .
The Board of Pardons, and not the sentencing court, had the
authority to determine whether to grant credit for time served
pending the outcome of petitioner's new criminal trial.

The time

served by the petitioner before his challenged new third degree
felony conviction was properly considered as serving part of his
two five-to-life sentences of which he was already convicted. The
trial court could not order the Board to also give credit for this
time on the new conviction.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly dismissed Mr. Thomas' petition for
an

extraordinary

writ

and

its decision

affirmed.

should

therefore be

>^

Respectfully submitted this ^— / ^njay of January, 1995.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent-Appellee Scott Carver, postage
prepaid, to the following on this the
Richard Dee Thomas
Inmate No. 13260
P. 0. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84 020
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JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
Attorney for Respondents
330 South 300 East, Second Floor
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD DEE THOMAS,

:

Petitioner,

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS
and FINAL ORDER

:

v.

:

SCOTT CARVER, Warden, et a L ,

:

Case No. 930907154 EC
Judge Michael R. Murphy
Respondents.

:

This matter came before the Court on Thursday, May 12, 1994,
at 9:15 a.m. to consider Respondents' motion to dismiss and the
merits

of

Petitioner's

petition

for

extraordinary

relief.

Petitioner was present and represented pro se and Lorenzo K.
Miller, Assistant Attorney General, appeared on behalf of the Utah
Board of Pardons and Parole (hereinafter "Board11).
thoroughly

reviewed

all memorandum, pleadings

The Court has
and

supporting

documents filed in this case, and having heard argument from the
parties, issued

its decision and judgment.

Based upon the

foregoing, the court now makes the following findings:

C0121

Findings of Pact
Petitioner Richard D. Thomas, an inmate lawfully incarcerated
at the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah, is serving several
indeterminate sentences of imprisonment for crimes against the
state, including Distributing (a third degree felony), Aggravated
Robbery (a first degree felony), Aggravated Kidnapping (a first
degree felony), and Attempted Escape

(a third degree felony).

Prior to the foregoing convictions, Petitioner was also serving
indeterminate sentences for the crimes of Theft (a third degree
felony) and Grand Larceny (a second degree felony).
On February 20, 1974, Petitioner appeared before the Utah
Board of Pardons for an original parole grant hearing, and the
Board denied parole. Subsequently, the Board reheard Petitioner's
case and granted him a parole date.

Since that time, Petitioner

has paroled from the prison on at least four separate occasions and
he violated his parole agreement on each occasion.

Afterwards,

each of his paroles was revoked by the Board.
On July 21, 1989, after the service of eight months on his
sixth felony conviction in Case No. 881910631 and his fourth parole
violation,

Petitioner again appeared before

the Board

for a

rehearing to determine whether another parole date would be given.
At that time, the Board granted Petitioner the conditional parole
date of May 26, 1992.

However, on October 30, 1990, the Board
2

C0122

rescinded that date based upon a new conviction for a Class A
Misdemeanor. The Board issued a new parole date for September 22,
1992.
On September 22# 1992, Petitioner paroled from the prison, but
on October 6, 1992, the Board issued a warrant to detain him on
allegations that he had again violated his parole agreement.
was arrested the day the warrant was issued.

He

On January 6, 1993,

Petitioner appeared before the Board for a parole revocation
hearing to answer the allegations that he had violated his parole
agreement.

The hearing was conducted in accordance with R671 of

the Utah Administrative Code (1993).

Petitioner was present and

represented by legal counsel.
Petitioner pled not guilty to the following parole violation
allegations: 1) having committed failed programming; 2) having
failed urinalysis; and 3) having committed the crime of Possession
of a Controlled Substance.

The Board then continued the matter,

setting an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual disputes
surrounding the parole violation allegations.
On March 8, 1993, an evidentiary hearing was conducted by the
Board in accordance with R671 of the Utah Administrative Code
(1993). The Board received testimony and documentary evidence and
heard argument from both Petitioner's counsel and the Department of
Corrections.

Based upon the evidence, the Board found that
3

00123

Petitioner had violated his parole agreement, and it revoked his
parole.

The Board then set a new parole date for April 13, 1993.

Petitioner was given a written decision, including the Board's
rationale. The Board also issued written findings and conclusions,
and provided those to Petitioner.
On April 13, 1993, Petitioner paroled from the prison, but on
June 18, 1993, the Board issued warrant for Petitioner arrest based
upon allegations that he had again violated his parole agreement.
He was arrested on that warrant on July 1, 1993, and returned to
the prison to await a revocation proceedings in accordance with
R671 of the Utah Administrative Code (1993).
Subsequently, Petitioner was charged in the Third Judicial
District Court for Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, with
the use of a firearm.

Petitioner appeared before the Board on

September 8, 1993, for a parole revocation hearing to answer the
allegations that he violated his parole agreement.

At that time,

the Board continued the hearing, in accordance with R671-505 of the
Utah Administrative Code (1993), to await final disposition of the
criminal charges.

Apparently, Petitioner has pled not guilty to

aggravated robbery, and the criminal case is scheduled to be tried
on August 2, 1994, before the Third Judicial District Court, Case
No. 931901914 FS.

4
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On December 13, 1993, Petitioner filed the instant petition
claiming that the Board has failed to credit him with time served.
Petitioner did not identify the specific time for which he claims
credit.

Instead, he alleges that the Board is refusing to grant

the credit that the "Sentencing Judge Richard Moffat, did do in
(commitment), . . . "

The Judgment and Commitment signed by Judge

Moffat states that "Defendant is to receive credit for time served
since returned."
The Board answered Petitioner's petition, pursuant to this
court's order, and it denied failing to give Petitioner credit for
any time to which he is legally entitled.

As calculated by the

Board, Petitioner's sentences of imprisonment will not statutorily
expire until after Petitioner's death, unless shortened by the
Board.1

Furthermore,

the

records

of

the

Board

show

that

Petitioner's sentence in Case No. 881910631 expired on December 4,
1993 (approximately five years from the date he was committed to
the prison), and both parties agree that specific sentence has
terminated.
Having made the foregoing findings, the court makes the
following conclusions:

1

Petitioner is serving two concurrent five-to-life sentences
with a consecutive zero-to-five year sentence.
5
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Conclusions of Law
Petitioner's claims of double jeopardy and of credit for time
served are without merit. As a result of Petitioner's November 22,
1988 conviction, Judge Moffat ordered that Petitioner be given
credit for time served awaiting resolution of that specific case.
The court concludes, without determining the legality of that
order, that it extended no further than granting credit against the
specific prison term imposed in Case No. 881910631. The court also
concludes that Petitioner's request for credit in that case is now
moot since the sentence of imprisonment in Case No. 881910631 has
already expired.
The

court

approximately

has

considered

thirty-nine

Petitioner's

request

to apply

(39) months of time served against

Petitioner's two five-to-life prison sentences, and the court
concludes that such a claim is also without merit.

Granting

Petitioner credit for time served in Case No. 881910631 would make
an insignificant difference to Petitioner's actual prison term.
Under Utah law, Petitioner's sentences will not statutorily expire
until five years after his death.
credit

would

not

change

the

Thus, granting 39 months of

actual

time

Petitioner

spends

incarcerated at the prison, a decision which is left to the Board's
discretion in this case.
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Furthermore, the court concludes that even if granting credit
would somehow make a difference in this case, the court has no
legal authority to order the Board to grant the credit Petitioner
requests. Accordingly, the court concludes that Petitioner has no
legal basis for the relief he seeks, and thus his claims against
the Board are without merit and should be dismissed as a matter of
law.
Having made the foregoing findings and conclusions, the court
now makes the following Order:
Order
1.

Petitioner's request for extraordinary relief is denied.

2.

Respondents' Motion for Judgment is granted.

3.

This action is dismissed with prejudice as a matter of
law.

DATED this

g) day o f « j , 1994.
BY THE COUja^.^

HONORABLE MICHAEL RJ
Third Judicial District Court
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